CWE-1245: Improper Finite State Machines (FSMs) in Hardware Logic
The functionality and security of the system heavily depend on the implementation of FSMs. FSMs can be used to indicate the current security state of the system. Lots of secure data operations and data transfers rely on the state reported by the FSM. Faulty FSM designs that do not account for all states, either through undefined states (left as don't cares) or through incorrect implementation, might lead an attacker to drive the system into an unstable state from which the system cannot recover without a reset, thus causing a DoS. Depending on what the FSM is used for, an attacker might also gain additional privileges to launch further attacks and compromise the security guarantees.
Modes of Introduction
| Phase | Note |
|---|---|
| Architecture and Design | |
| Implementation |
Applicable Platforms
| Type | Class | Name | Prevalence |
|---|---|---|---|
| Language | Not Language-Specific | ||
| Operating_system | Not OS-Specific | ||
| Architecture | Not Architecture-Specific | ||
| Technology | System on Chip |
Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC)
The Common Attack Pattern Enumeration and Classification (CAPEC™) effort provides a publicly available catalog of common attack patterns that helps users understand how adversaries exploit weaknesses in applications and other cyber-enabled capabilities.
CAPEC at Mitre.org